








TESTING COLLUSIVE PRICES IN A MULTIMARKET 
CONTEXT: THE EUROPEAN CASE OF VITAMIN C
* 
 







Correspondencia a:  Jacint Balaguer, Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, 12071 Castellón (Spain). 
Telephone: +34 964 72 86 12; Fax: +34 964 728591. E-mail: coll@eco.uji.es). 
 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Marzo 2005 
Depósito Legal: V-1422-2005 
 
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage a 






                                                 
* Financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (SEC 2002-03915), Fundació Bancaixa (P1 
1B2004-28) and Ivie is gratefully acknowledged. 
** J. Balaguer and V. Orts: Universitat Jaume I; E. Uriel: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas and 
Universitat de València.   
  2 
TESTING COLLUSIVE PRICES IN A MULTIMARKET CONTEXT: 
THE EUROPEAN CASE OF VITAMIN C 
 




In this paper, we suggest a method to test price-fixing agreements. Prices fixed 
to multiple shipments are decomposed into a set of destination market effects and time 
effects in order to allow us to perform an analysis of residuals. We examine the pricing 
behavior of vitamin C in the European destination markets of German exports. We 
explore two different periods: January 1991 to August 1995 and September 1995 to 
September 2001. Empirical results on the first period, which are consistent with our 
knowledge obtained from firms’ confessions about illegal agreements, contrast notably 
with those obtained on the more recent period.  
Keywords: Collusion; International markets; Vitamin C 




En este trabajo proponemos un método para contrastar la presencia de prácticas 
no competitivas en precios. Cada uno de los precios fijados para diferentes mercados es 
descompuesto en un efecto fijo por destino y un efecto temporal con objeto de analizar 
los residuos. Los precios de la vitamina C en los mercados  de destino de las 
exportaciones alemanas son examinados en dos periodos: de enero de 1991 a agosto de 
1995 y de septiembre de 1995 a septiembre de 2001. Los resultados para el primer 
periodo, los cuales son consistentes con nuestro conocimiento obtenido de las 
confesiones de las empresas participantes en los acuerdos ilegales, contrastan 
notablemente con los obtenidos para un período más reciente. 
Palabras clave: Colusión; Mercados internacionales; Vitamina C 
Clasificación JEL: D43, L12, L41, L65  
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1.  Introduction 
Unfortunately, price-fixing agreements are a frequent feature in oligopolistic 
market structures. It is obvious that sanctions are not enough to dissuade these illegal 
practices. This is not surprising because it can yield considerable profits for 
participating firms and because there is no straightforward way it can be identified by 
antitrust agencies. Social welfare is likely to suffer notable losses in cases in which 
there are elements like the importance of the product for consumers, the large size of 
the geographic markets where participants operate, or maintaining illegal practices over 
a number of years. The very well known collusion between the primary manufacturers 
of vitamins is a good example displaying those elements. This is the reason why, at the 
end of 2001, the European Commission imposed record fines against eight 
pharmaceutical companies (bearing in mind that an important part of the agreement 
took place in the European economic area).
1 The damaging effects of the firms’ 
infringements could be illustrated by the following declarations made by the President 
of the Commission: 
 “This is the most damaging series of cartels the Commission has ever investigated due 
to the sheer range of vitamins covered which are found in a multitude of products from cereals, 
biscuits and drinks to animal feed, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics… The companies' collusive 
behavior enabled them to charge higher prices than if the full forces of competition had been at 
play, damaging consumers and allowing the companies to pocket illicit profits. It is 
particularly unacceptable that this illegal behavior concerned substances which are vital 
elements for nutrition and essential for normal growth and maintenance of life.” (Mario Monti, 
November 2001) 
In this case, some participants cooperated with the European Commission
2 and 
admitted the existence of cartel agreements quite early on, thus facilitating the 
investigation, after being encouraged by the possibility of obtaining a substantial 
reduction in the fines that would eventually be imposed. Nevertheless, identification of 
illegal practices is a complicated affair. The tools available for antitrust agencies are 
                                                 
1 Fines were imposed on the following companies (in order of importance): Hoffmann-La Roche 
(Switzerland), BASF AG (Germany), Aventis SA (France), Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV (Netherlands), 
Merck KgaA (Germany), Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Japan), Esai Co Ltd (Japan), and Takeda 
Chemical Industries Ltd (Japan). 
2  Price agreements take place in other important markets like USA. Therefore, participants also 
cooperated with the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Grand Jury.  
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poor. The aim of this paper is to provide a methodology that can be used to help 
identify the presence of non-competitive pricing behavior in a simple fashion. We 
suggest an empirical approach which will allow us to test the hypothesis of price 
collusion when firms operate in multiple markets.
3 There are at least two interesting 
implications that characterize this approach. First, only a data set of product prices 
fixed to several destination markets will be necessary, which implies that the 
methodology has a low cost. Second, since the methodology is based on a multimarket 
model, the analysis is expected to be useful for application to certain contexts where 
illegal agreements on prices are more likely. This idea is supported by recent studies, 
which show that firms’ contact in multiple markets may enhance abilities to collude 
(Paker and Röller, 1997; Gupta, 2001).  
A data set regarding prices fixed by German exporters of vitamin C over the 
admitted period of collusion will allow us to determine whether the empirical approach 
is valid to help identify price-fixing agreements. We also used the suggested 
methodology to investigate pricing behavior after this period. In this way, we tested 
whether authorities’ control over the later period, with regard to the defense of 
competition, had been successful. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops an economic 
framework and discusses the implications of different market structures. In section 3 
we propose the econometric specification and present the implications of a framework 
of price collusion and for two alternative market structures. In section 4 we explore the 
approach using export data on vitamin C for the European market. The two different 
periods are examined using month-to-month data. The first covers the period 1991:1 to 
1995:8, where collusion is admitted by firms, and the second involves  the period 
1995:9 to 2001:9, where no price coordination is expected. The final section provides 
the summary conclusions. 
2.  The economic approximation 
The economic framework used in this paper is focused on a profit-maximizing 
firm behavior that produces homogeneous goods for sale in  N separate destination 
                                                 
3 The presence of collusion could be caused by an express agreement or by the existence of conscious 
parallelism (or tacit collusion). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper there is no need to distinguish 
between the two terms (although it has led to some confusion in legal proceedings). For a traditional 
explanation of cartel theory in both cases, see Stigler (1964).   
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markets, which are indexed by i. First order conditions for profit maximization could be 
described by prices (in fob terms) obtained as the product of the marginal cost (MCt) 
and a mark-up (fit), as follows:  
  i it
N
i
t it t it w q MC p " ￿ = , ) , ( f   (1) 
where  t=1,…,T index time. The marginal cost  MCt, which is common to the  N 
destination markets, is a function of the level of total production of the firm  ￿
N
i
it q , and 
the input price wt.  
Assuming that destination-specific mark-up could depend on price 
competitiveness, we can define it as the relative price in local market terms (Hung et 
al., 1993; Kongsted, 1998). In this way, an approximation of the optimal price, where 
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where  i k  is a constant term of mark-up over marginal cost which is specific to market 
i,
4 pit
c is an index of prices of local competitors (in cif terms),  i f represents the specific 













 is the 
relative price in local market i. The coefficient b should be interpreted as the relative 
price elasticity of the mark-up  (b>0). Lastly,  eit is a stochastic variable which is 
independent, identically normally distributed with mean zero and variance
2
e s .  
The involvement of the different market structures on non-random components 
in equation (2) is straightforward. Let us consider the single competitive market, where 
i it
c
it f p p = . The fulfillment of this hypothesis requires prices to be equal to marginal 
cost, which is common across destination markets and implies lnki=bln( ) 1 =0.  
An alternative hypothesis is the presence of collusive prices. Although this 
hypothesis also implies price parallelism between firms within each destination market, 
                                                 
4 A constant term of mark-up could be associated to stable aspects like the distance between the firms 
and the destination market or the dimension of the specific market i.  
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in this case the relative price can take a value other than one. When this occurs, then 














b b . Furthermore, in this interesting case, firms’ practices 
presumably involve third degree price discrimination as well as the segmentation of 
markets. Thus, the existence of mark-up differences across destinations are represented 
in equation (2) by  ( ) i i P ln ln b k + . 
Lastly, changes in the relative price are inconsistent with both hypotheses 
(perfect competition and price collusion). This phenomenon is consistent with an 
extensive range of imperfect competition market structures  in which the degree of 
competition is directly related to the value of the relative price elasticity b. In this range 
of cases, firms take into account changes in relative prices. Since the optimal price 
becomes an endogenous variable, the total effect is obtained by: 
    it
c
it i i t it p f k MC p ge g g g g + - + - + + = ln ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ln ln ln   (3) 
where g=1/(1+b). Equation (3) shows that while b is large (or g is low), the firm follows 
competitors’ prices and the market is characterized by a high degree of competition. 
The next section presents a simplification of equation (3) that will be capable of 
distinguishing the market structure in which we are interested from a range of 
intermediate market structures and from the perfect competitive case. 
3.  Research design 
This section centers on the research design used to test collusion in a simple 
fashion and its empirical implications. Research design is based on a decomposition of 
prices p it, where explanatory variables of equation (3) are taken to be unobservable. 
Differences between the closely related markets will allow us to trace the effects of the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of destination markets and common changes (like marginal 
cost, which is in accordance with the central ideas of the “new empirical industrial 
organization” studies, surveyed in Bresnahan, 1989). Since we take the relative price to 
be an unobservable variable, requirements of statistical information are low and the 
methodology involves a notable degree of pragmatism. It is obvious that sometimes a 
scarcity of data at firm level makes it difficult to build an accurate index of competitors' 
prices for each of the destination markets.  
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Price decomposition could be represented as a fixed-effects regression model, as 
follows: 
  it i t it p n l q a + + + = ln   (4) 
where a is a constant term, qt are the coefficients of the time effects which capture any 
common movements in prices over time across all destination markets (and, obviously, 
excludes q1 to avoid collinearity with the constant term), and li is a set of market effects 
(that excludes l1). The last term, nit, is an error term. The implication of the coefficients 
of equation (4) in the diverse market structures could be illustrated by the economic 
framework described in the previous section.  
First, the fulfillment of the perfect competitive hypothesis implies that firm 
prices are fully explained by the constant term and the set of time effects. Thus, li is 
zero for overall destination markets and the regression disturbance (nit) equals eit. In 
this case, while the constant a captures the marginal cost that corresponds to the first 
period ( CM1), the time effects  qt  will measure their evolution ( MCt, t=2,..,T).
  This 
evolution equals the common changes in price in each period. 
Second, the fulfillment of the hypothesis concerning non-competitive 
segmented markets, where pricing behavior depends on the idiosyncratic demand 
schedule faced by the firm inside each market, requires li to have a value other than 
zero. While qt captures both the evolution of common mark-up and marginal cost, li, 
(i=2,..,N) indicates the specific mark-up difference from the destination country 
indexed by i=1. If price coordination implies that pit equals pit
c,
5 then nit is distributed in 
an identical and independent manner and is equal to eit. 
In the alternative market structures relative prices come into play. Therefore, the 
constant term, and the fixed effects from equation (4) are insufficient to explain pricing 
behavior. In this case, the error term ( nit) captures both a random factor and a 
deterministic factor. More specifically, it captures geit + (1-g) lnpit
c, where g acts as the 
coefficient for the linear combination of the random and a deterministic factor.  
 
 
                                                 
5 In the more general case of price parallelism in destination markets, it could also include the constant 
gap between firms’ prices.  
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4.  Data and results 
In this section, we conduct an empirical analysis of the pricing behavior in the 
European Union markets of vitamin C, which is, together with vitamins A and E, one 
of most important products sold by drug firms (Table 1). A first stage of the analysis is 
based on OLS estimation from equation (4). To do so, we use unit values as a proxy 
variable of export prices of the vitamin. Unit value indices are calculated from data 
collected from the COMEXT database (published by Eurostat).
6 We have chosen to 
study the value indices obtained from German exports, which will represent the price 
dynamics of two of the four firms involved in the illegal agreements (BASF AG and 
Merck KgaA).
7  Furthermore, German shipments provide a steady, important volume 
of vitamin exports to several destination markets on a monthly basis. The study focuses 
on the main destination markets of German vitamin C exports in the European Union. 
In particular, we will obtain specific results for France, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain and Austria. The export data covers both 
the whole period of successful collusion in the European market, following the 
information offered by the Official Journal of the European Communities (Commission 
Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512),
8 that is to say, 1991:1 to 
1995:8
9 and a more recent period between 1995:9 and 2001:9.
  From the results 
obtained by the investigation carried out by the Commission, we expect the illegal 
agreements to  have been finished in this latter period.
10 We will thus be able to 
compare results for both periods. 
                                                 
6 Database follows  the  Integrated Tariff of the European Communities classification. Vitamin C is 
classified with code number 293627. 
7 The remaining firms implied in the vitamin C agreements belong to Switzerland (Hoffmann-La Roche) 
and Japan (Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd). 
8 As the Official Journal indicates the importance and the duration of the agreements is not necessarily 
the same for all participants and destination countries. 
9 German firms are subjected in destination markets of exports to frequent variations in the exchange 
rates throughout of this period, which induces automatically changes in competitiveness. Then, without 
the existence of price agreements, the relative prices would change regularly following the models based 
in the pricing-to-market behaviour (Krugman, 1987; Dornbusch, 1987). 
10 Although the precise stage at which the agreement on vitamin C was withdrawn is not documented, 
the Commission’s decision is based on this date.  










1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
1991:1-1995:8 1995:9-2001:9
TABLE 1.  Market shares of sales by vitamin types in the EU market 
 
Product  1994  1996  1998 
 
Vitamin C  27.79  20.84  15.24 
Vitamin E  23.18  27.81  31.74 
Vitamin A  16.97  18.30  18.98 
Beta Carotene  6.81  8.45  9.83 
Canthaxanthin  6.01  6.34  6.45 
Vitamin B2  5.06  4.88  4.36 
Biotin (H)  4.32  3.96  2.98 
Pantothenates/calpan (B5)  3.83  4.08  4.51 
Vitamin B1  2.18  1.58  1.91 
Vitamin D3   1.98  2.54  2.61 
Vitamin B6  1.87  1.21  1.39 
 
Source: Percentages calculated from data published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities (10/1/2003) 
 
Estimated time effects are represented in Figure 1. We can observe that the 
common price evolution of vitamin C differs clearly between the two periods. While 
the common component of prices was quite stable over the collusion period, it 
decreased dramatically during the first two years of the later period.  This finding 
appears as an immediate consequence of ending the agreements on vitamin C. 
 
FIGURE 1.  Estimated time effects for the two periods. 
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In a second stage, we studied the residuals of regression for both periods with 
the purpose of determining whether a deterministic component is included. If such a 
deterministic component is revealed, then collusion and a perfect competitive market 
would be rejected. Otherwise, the presence of idiosyncratic mark-up according to 
destination can separate these last two alternatives.  
Table 2 and 3 present the analysis of residuals for the first period (1991:1 to 
1995:8) based on the Box-Pierce statistic (Box and Pierce, 1970) and on the Box-Ljung 
statistic (Ljung and Box, 1979), respectively. We explored the statistical results with a 
set of degrees of freedom (L=1,2,..10) for each destination country. We cannot deny 
that, in general, the residuals follow a white noise process. When we attempt to apply 
the Box-Pierce statistic, we cannot reject independence of residuals over time for sixty-
five out of seventy cases at the 1-percent level. When the Box-Ljung statistic is applied, 
the hypothesis is not rejected in sixty-two out of seventy cases. The only clear 
exception corresponds to Belgium-Luxembourg as a destination where, in view of 
results, we can conclude that illegal agreements did not take place at all during the 
period under consideration. Therefore, the evidence obtained is, in general, consequent 
with the presence of price parallelism over this period. However, a white noise process 
is a necessary but insufficient condition to support price coordination. 
 Rejection of perfect competition, in favor of non-competitive prices, is 
corroborated by significant differences in the estimations of country-fixed effects. As 
well as the product’s being homogeneous, from the results included in Table 4, we can 
infer that there is a constant mark-up component which depends critically on the 
destination country.
 11 That is, for example, mark-ups obtained from sales to both Spain 
and Italy are significantly smaller than the mark-up obtained from sales to the French 
market (which is the reference country in the regression). Obviously, differences in 
mark-ups across destinations agree with the price collusion that was proved to have 
existed over this period. 
 
 
                                                 
11 In practice, differences in country effects may result from other aspects that have not been considered. 
For example, country effects could pick up differences in product quality across destination countries 
which are caused by differences in tastes or per capita incomes.  
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Note: Statistic is distributed as the chi-squared with L degrees of freedom. Values in brackets correspond to significance levels. Results were obtained with Limdep 7.0. 
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Note: Statistic is distributed as the chi-squared with L degrees of freedom. Values in brackets correspond to significance levels. Results were performed with Limdep 7.0.  
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TABLE 4. Estimates of constant term and country-fixed effects for the period 1991:1 to 1995:8. 
 
 
Constant and       











































Note: The reference group is France. A positive coefficient means that export prices are on 
average more expensive than the reference group.  The t-statistics. which are in brackets, are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. The estimates were performed with Limdep 7.0.  
  14 
The residuals obtained from the most recent period were also analyzed using the 
values of the Box-Pierce and the Box-Ljung statistics. Table 5 and 6 includes results for 
these statistics, respectively. As we can see, results contrast notably with those obtained 
over the admitted price coordination period. We now reject, at the 1 per cent level, a 
white noise process for residuals in all destination countries in a very clear way. It can 
therefore be inferred that residuals capture a deterministic component and, 
consequently, time and destination effects are insufficient to explain the German 
pricing behavior. The presence of a deterministic component supports the presence of 
non-cooperative strategies on prices in an imperfect competition framework.   
5.  Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of this paper was to provide a simple and useful method with 
which to investigate the presence of illegal price agreements in international markets. 
The hypothesis of price collusion has been stated throughout our analysis. We divided 
the other market structures  into two alternative hypotheses, namely, the perfectly 
competitive market hypothesis, and a wide range of market structures where there are 
changes in competitiveness which affect optimal prices. We suggest a simple empirical 
model in which each of these a lternatives can be chosen with little statistical 
information being required. The approach is based on the estimation of a two-factor 
fixed-effects model and on the analysis of residuals.  
The European market for vitamin C provides an excellent framework in which 
to explore the usefulness of an empirical approach and to obtain evidence about price 
behavior in recent years in scenarios where we expect competitive behavior to have 
occurred. To achieve this, we use a variable proxy for the German export prices over 
two different periods. First, a period of general agreements of price collusion is 
admitted by participating firms (from January 1991 to August 1995). Second, there is 
another later period where information reported by firms indicates that there was no 
price collusion (from September 1995 to September 2001). Empirical results obtained 
about the first period were consistent with the fulfillment of the non-competitive price 
hypothesis for most of the destination markets. More specifically, we found a great deal 
of evidence for price parallelism within international markets and discriminatory 
pricing across destinations. These empirical results are radically different to those 
obtained from the last period. We infer that, in the most recent period, the mark-up of 
the German firms was reacting to changes in international competitiveness. This 
finding coincides with the withdrawal of the vitamin C cartel. We hope that the 
empirical approach suggested in this paper helps to identify future illegal pricing 
behaviors and to hinder their growth.  
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Note: Statistic is distributed as the chi-squared with L degrees of freedom. Values in brackets correspond to significance levels. Results were performed with Limdep 7.0. 
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Note: Statistic is distributed as the chi-squared with  L  degrees of freedom. Values in brackets correspond to significance levels. Results were performed with  Limdep 7.0. 
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